John perry a dialogue on personal identity and immortality pdf
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- PHIL 176: Death
- Artificial intelligence and personal identity
- A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality
- John Perry
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PHIL 176: Death
The lecture focuses on the question of the metaphysical key to personal identity. What does it mean for a person that presently exists to be the very same person in the future? Difficulties with that approach are then discussed, independent of the question whether souls exist or not. Chapter 1.
For those of you who still do believe in the existence of souls, I suppose you could take a great deal of the discussion that follows as some form of large conditional or subjunctive. First, we had to get clear on, what am I?
What are my parts? Am I a body and an immaterial soul as well? Or perhaps, strictly speaking, just the soul? What would it be for a thing like that to continue to exist? Could it even make sense for a person to survive the death of his body? But in order to address that particular question — What is for me to survive the death of my body?
Is that even a possibility or not? Take the more familiar hum-drum case. Here I am lecturing to you today, Thursday. The question of survival can be asked about that very simple case. Will that person survive the weekend? I certainly expect to survive the weekend. But what is it to survive the weekend? What is it? So the question we want to get clear on is, what is it for somebody on Tuesday to be the same person as the person here talking to you on Thursday?
We can ask the question more grandly, about larger expanses of time. Could that be me? To ask, have I survived until ? How could they be the same person? Suppose you and I are walking along and we see a train. So let me draw the train first. We start walking. I point to the caboose. Look how long that train is!
Who could possibly make a mistake like that? And so forth and so on. How could you make such a silly mistake? I agree, of course, that a locomotive is not the same thing as a caboose. Rather, initially when we started our walk, I pointed to a caboose, but by pointing to the caboose, I picked out a train. This long, extended-through-space object, the train. And that claim, far from being false, is true. Now, as I say, none of us would make that mistake.
And that mistake might mislead us if we start thinking about the personal identity case. We see a caboose. No, of course not. I mean to be talking about an entire train. Some entire extended-through-space train.
Are they the same train? Suppose we had x-ray vision and could see through the building. But it might not turn out that way. All right, easy enough with trains. We know how it works with trains. I used to have a car I bought in My ability to draw cars is even worse than my ability to draw trains. It was new. It was sparkly. Then I drove it for some years and I got some dents and so forth and so on. The sparkle had gone. It had a couple of dents.
That was the car in By , it had a lot of dents, , when it finally died. All right, now we all understand the claim that the car I had in was the very same car as the car I had in We all know that in the car had a lot of scratches and had gotten banged in on one side and pretty sorry looking in terms of the scrapes and the paint job and the rust.
Whereas, the car in , new and shiny and smooth. You might say the car stage is obviously not the same thing as the car stage. I mean to be talking about a single thing that was extended through time. When I refer to my car — as opposed to what we could dub the car stage or the car slice — when I refer to the car in , I mean to be talking about the entire extended-through-time object.
That car stage or that car slice, if we wanted to talk about it that way, has only been around for however long, months, years, a year. At the end of , my engine failed. I sold the car to a dealer, junk dealer. Suppose that in I see a car in the junk lot and it looks familiar to me. This is sort of like the case with the factory blocking the view. Saw the car every day in my garage.
Maybe not. Maybe obviously not. But we know what the possibilities are. It could be the very same car. If we knew what it took to have the various stages of a car add up to the very same car, then that would be one possibility. But there might be a different possibility. It could have been that after I sold it to the junk dealer, he crushed it, turned it into a heap of metal and that was the end of my car. Looks a bit like a worm.
So philosophers call them space-time worms. Is the space-time worm that makes up this car the same space-time worm as the one that made up my car? One worm there or two? Should we say, as we might say with the train, the train is made up out of the various cars, the locomotive, the caboose, and the intervening cars? The metaphysically fundamental things are the caboose, the locomotives, the intervening trains.
On some metaphysical views, you might say, just exactly like with the train, the car stages are the metaphysically fundamental things and a car, something extended through time, is glued together like a sandwich from the car stages.
All right. In thinking about cars, should we say that the fundamental thing is the car stages and they get put together like a sandwich to make cars? Or should we think that the fundamental thing is the car extended through time and it can be sliced up to make car stages? You should also notice that- I should also mention that there are other metaphysical views about what goes on when an object exists over time.
These are interesting and difficult questions. So I will help myself to this language of space-time worms, objects that extend not only over space but also over time. And distinguish the entire worm from the various slices or stages that either make up the worm or that we could slice the worm into.
What is it in the case of cars? What makes the car stage a stage in the very same car, the extended through space and time worm car, as the stage? There was the car. A car is just some metal and plastic, rubber.
And that very same hunk continued into and it continued into The glue, the key to identity across time for cars, is being the same hunk of stuff. Look, think about my steering wheel. Every time I grabbed the steering wheel to drive, I wore away thousands of atoms. You can lose some atoms and still be the very same steering wheel.
Artificial intelligence and personal identity
Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. Perry Published Psychology. Perry's excellent dialogue makes a complicated topic stimulating and accessible without any sacrifice of scholarly accuracy or thoroughness. Professionals will appreciate the work's command of the issues and depth of argument, while students will find that it excites interest and imagination. Save to Library. Create Alert.
A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality is a book by the philosopher John Perry. It has been translated into Spanish, Chinese, Persian and Korean.
A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality
Streaming Video Help. The lecture focuses on the question of the metaphysical key to personal identity. What does it mean for a person that presently exists to be the very same person in the future? The first approach to answering this question is the "soul theory," that is, the key to being the same person is having the same soul. Difficulties with that approach are then discussed, independent of the question whether souls exist or not.
What justifies our holding one person over another morally responsible for a past action? Why am I justified in having a special prudential concern for one particular future person over all others? Why do many of us think that maximizing the good within a single life is perfectly acceptable, but maximizing the good across lives is wrong? For these and other normative questions, it looks like any answer we come up with will have to make essential reference to personal identity.
It deals with standard problems in the theory of personal identity in the form of a dialogue between a terminally ill university professor at a small Midwestern college, Gretchen Weirob, and her two friends, Sam Miller and Dave Cohen. The format of associating different philosophical positions with different characters in a dialogue recalls David Hume 's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. David M. Rosenthal believes that the book is appropriate for both professionals and students because it "makes a complicated topic stimulating and accessible without any sacrifice of scholarly accuracy or thoroughness. This article about a philosophy -related book is a stub.
Definition of Survival : To survive means that there would be someone for whom it would be appropriate for me to anticipate having their future experiences. You are here now, and then in the future, there will be someone who is you. The moral: exact or very close similarity similarity does not amount to identity. Unlike Kleenex boxes, we have immaterial minds or souls that allow us to track identity across time. To say that one person is identical to another is to say that they have the same immaterial souls. The problem is especially acute since souls are assumed to be so intangible. In practice, we simply assume a bodily criterion for personal identity.
Considerations of personal identity bear on John Searle's Chinese Room argument, and on the opposed position that a computer itself could really understand a natural language. In this paper I develop the notion of a virtual person , modelled on the concept of virtual machines familiar in computer science. I show how Searle's argument, and J. Maloney's attempt to defend it, fail. I conclude that Searle is correct in holding that no digital machine could understand language, but wrong in holding that artificial minds are impossible: minds and persons are not the same as the machines, biological or electronic, that realize them. This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.
Nathan Oaklander - - Philo 4 (2) Personal safesaskwater.org Perry (ed.) - - University of California Press.
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Sign in Create an account. Syntax Advanced Search. A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality. John Perry. Hackett John Perry University of California, Riverside.
Какая разница, Стратмор никогда не решится выстрелить, пока он прикрыт Сьюзан. Но когда он начал подниматься на следующую ступеньку, не выпуская Сьюзан из рук, произошло нечто неожиданное.